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How Do We Keep Desire from Passing with Beauty? 
Pamela L. Caughie 
Loyola University Chicago 
On the day of her party in June 1923, Clarissa Dalloway worries about 
her attraction to beauty in the face of a political and humanitarian crisis: 
He [Richard] was already halfway to the House of Commons, to his 
Armenians, his Albanians, having settled her on the sofa, looking at his 
roses. And people would say, "Clarissa Dalloway is spoilt." She cared much 
more for her roses than for the Armenians. Hunted out of existence, maimed, 
frozen, the victims of cruelty and injustice (she had heard Richard say so over 
and over again)-no, she could feel nothing for the Albanians, or was it the 
Armenians? but she loved her roses (didn't hat help the Armenians?).' 
This passage resonates with our contemporary situation, evoking as it does 
the recent fighting in Kosovo, which was in the news when I proposed an 
MLA paper for the panel on "Theorizing Beauty," as well as recent writings 
that explicitly or implicitly link beauty with social justice. By way of 
answering my title question-"How do we keep desire from passing with 
beauty?"-I want to discuss everal works that reiterate Clarissa's question, 
especially in relation to the crisis of responsibility hat is said to follow in 
the wake of postmodern theories and cultural criticism. 
In an early feminist article published in 1977, Clarissa's question-"but 
she loved her roses (didn't that help the Armenians?)"-is taken seriously, 
perhaps for the first ime in Woolf criticism, by Lee Edwards. Arguing that 
forms of social organization foster particular values, Edwards asserts, "the 
politics of Mrs. Dalloway are such that life is possible only when roses, par- 
ties, and joy triumph over war, authority, and death."2 Edwards admits that 
most readers would likely agree with this statement yet would be skeptical 
of the claim that throwing parties and admiring roses offer a viable politi- 
cal response to social injustice. Yet the solution, Edwards argues, to the cri- 
sis of feeling that leads to Septimus Smith's death (a crisis brought on in 
part by a particular notion of masculinity and a social order structured to 
maintain it) is a mode of being that enhances feeling and a mode of action 
that harmonizes multiple feelings rather than promoting some and banish- 
ing others (p. 172). That solution is figured in Clarissa's party, a form of 
social organization that fosters the values of spontaneity, variability, and 
joy over the abstractions, hierarchies, and authoritarian values promoted 
by the dominant culture. How does this help the Armenians? Usually, the 
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question of how to help the Armenians would be answered by money, let- 
ters, acts of Parliament, or even war to oust the agents of oppression and 
establish a more just social order, Edwards ays (p. 175). An alternative 
would be a politics that allowed the joy of Clarissa's party to extend beyond 
the single house and the specific occasion. Would that help the 
Armenians? "Maybe," Edwards answers (p. 176). But whether or not that 
joy and beauty would help the Armenians, one thing is certain: "we damn 
ourselves if, in constructing a view of the world we deny a connection 
between politics and feelings . . . and so create a politics lacking both 
beauty and joy" (p. 177). 
Twenty-two years later, Elaine Scarry returns, in a sense, to Edwards's 
argument. Scarry, I imagine, would like to answer Mrs. Dalloway's question 
in the affirmative-yes, Clarissa, your admiration of roses does help the 
Armenians-for the argument of Scarry's recent book, On Beauty and 
Being Just, is that the love of beauty increases one's desire for social justice. 
How does beauty contribute to justice? For one, beauty is generative; it 
makes us want to reproduce it, to extend it, like Clarissa's party, beyond the 
particular site or moment. It arouses in us a kind of "perceptual care," 
Scarry says, that works against what she terms "lateral disregard," the 
notion that our attraction to one form of beauty (say, roses) blinds us to 
others (for example, cacti).3 For another, beauty and justice share roots in 
the concept of fairness. Quoting John Rawls's definition of fairness as "a 
symmetry ofeveryone's relations to each other" (p. 93), Scarry argues that 
beauty gives rise to the desire for symmetry and proportion that are attrib- 
utes of fairness in both its aesthetic and its legal senses.4 "It is the very sym- 
metry of beauty," Scarry writes, "which leads us to ... the symmetry that 
eventually comes into place in the realm of justice" (p. 97). The "percep- 
tual care" that comes from attending to the beautiful object-whether a 
bird's ong or a parliamentary debate-allows one to notice the absence of 
symmetry, subtlety, and fairness in unjust social and political relations. 
But can we be wrong about beauty, as we can be wrong about what is 
just when dealing with other people? "Being in error," Scarry writes, is one 
of the "abiding structural features" of beauty (p. 28): 
... beauty, sooner or later, brings us into contact with our own capacity for 
making errors. The beautiful, a most without any effort ofour own, acquaints 
us with the mental event of conviction, and so pleasurable a mental state is 
this that ever afterwards one is willing to labor, struggle, wrestle with the 
world to locate enduring sources of conviction-to locate what is true. (p. 
31) 
This is one reason that beauty is radically decentering, Scarry says. It 
moves us, so to speak; beautiful objects are, in her words, "wake-up calls to 
perception" (p. 81). And that just might help the Armenians. 
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To pursue Scarry's line of thought, let us consider a passage from another 
Woolf novel. In Part I of To the Lighthouse Lily Briscoe shares with William 
Bankes her painting of Mrs. Ramsay reading to James. Mr. Bankes's taste in 
painting runs to landscapes; Lily's painting "ma[kes] no attempt at like- 
ness": "the picture was not of them."5 Yet her aesthetics does value sym- 
metry, balance, and proportion-"a light here required a shadow there" (p. 
53)-the very qualities of beauty that Scarry says allows its appreciation to 
carry over into social justice. As Mr. Bankes admits, he is unprepared to 
appreciate Lily's art since "all his prejudices were on the other side" (p. 53), 
the side of mimetic representation. Still, 
Mr. Bankes was interested. Mother and child then-objects of universal ven- 
eration, and in this case the mother was famous for her beauty-might be 
reduced, he pondered, to a purple shadow without irreverence.... He took 
it scientifically incomplete good faith.... The question being one of the 
relations of masses, of lights and shadows, which, to be honest, he had never 
considered before, he would like to have it explained-what then did she 
wish to make of it? And he indicated the scene before them. She looked. She 
could not show him what she wished to make of it, could not see it even her- 
self, without a brush in her hand. (pp. 52-53) 
Has Lily succeeded in getting Mr. Bankes to see the beauty of her painting? 
Has his sense of the beautiful been laterally distributed to include abstract 
art, so that the balance and symmetry of the painting might be extended 
to the social sphere? The question sounds odd, even irrelevant. For Lily 
does not, any more than Matisse, as Scarry points out (p. 33), want to save 
lives through her art; her painting is not social or political in that sense. 
Nor does she seem concerned that Mr. Bankes judge her painting beauti- 
ful. Yet the painting succeeds in another way, by bringing two very differ- 
ent people together. As with Clarissa's party, what matters for Lily is that 
intimacy has been established, if only for a moment, and we might well 
agree that that kind of intimacy in itself can have broader social and polit- 
ical implications. 
Scarry, however, wants less to convince us of the beauty of any particu- 
lar kind of art or foliage (to teach us to love the palm tree as she has 
learned to love it) than to restore aesthetic appreciation to the humanities. 
For Scarry's book responds to the turn in literary studies from criticism to 
theory, or from aesthetic appreciation to cultural critique. "The vocabulary 
of beauty," she writes, "has been banished" in the humanities over the past 
two decades, though it flourishes, she says, in the sciences where truth is 
the object (p. 52).6 Where humanists have turned from evaluating a work 
of art in terms of its truth and beauty, scientists often talk in terms of a 
beautiful theory, Scarry says. The question for scientists is whether the 
beauty of a theory is incidental to or indicative of its truth (p. 52). 
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I want to return to the charge that beauty has been banished from liter- 
ary studies, but first I want to pursue its relation to truth. Let us turn again 
to a passage from Woolf, this time from Part II of To the Lighthouse, the sec- 
tion often seen as linking the pre- and post-World War I sections of the 
novel: 
At that season those who had gone down to pace the beach and ask of the 
sea and sky what message they reported or what vision they affirmed had to 
consider among the usual tokens of divine bounty-the sunset on the sea, 
the pallor of dawn, the moon rising, fishing-boats against the moon, and chil- 
dren making mud pies or pelting each other with andfuls ofgrass, omething 
out of harmony with this jocundity and this serenity. There was the silent 
apparition of an ashen-coloured ship for instance, come, gone; there was a 
purplish stain upon the bland surface of the sea as if something had boiled 
and bled, invisibly, beneath. This intrusion i to a scene calculated to stir the 
most sublime reflections and lead to the most comfortable conclusions stayed 
their pacing. It was difficult blandly to overlook them; to abolish their sig- 
nificance in the landscape; to continue, asone walked by the sea, to marvel 
how beauty outside mirrored beauty within. 
Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she complete what he 
began? With equal complacence she saw his misery, his meanness, and his 
torture. That dream, of sharing, completing, offinding in solitude on the 
beach an answer, was then but a reflection i a mirror, and the mirror itself 
was but the surface glassiness which forms in quiescence when the nobler 
powers sleep beneath? Impatient, despairing yet loth to go (for beauty offers 
her lures, has her consolations), topace the beach was impossible; contem- 
plation was unendurable; the mirror was broken. (pp. 133-34) 
The mirror has been broken ostensibly by the war. One might say that the 
unjust relations in the social sphere have broken the mirror-like r flection 
between the beauty of nature, on the one hand, and truth and justice on 
the other. Yet in this exemplary modernist work, it could just as well be the 
concept of art or language as mirroring the world that lies broken. If rep- 
resentation is no longer understood to be a mirror-like r flection of the 
external world (as, say, in Lily's painting), what does this mean for the rela- 
tion of beauty to truth? Is the beauty of a work of art or a piece of writing- 
a novel, a poem, a theory-a reflection of its truth-value? 
Martha Nussbaum seems to have no doubt that the beauty of a theory is 
an index of its truth, at least in the discipline of philosophy, and in this she 
differs from Scarry, who argues not that beauty reflects truth but that 
beauty "ignites the desire for truth" (p. 52). In her review of Judith Butler 
in The New Republic (February 1999), Nussbaum links Butler's writing to 
quietism and, worse, evil: "Judith Butler's hip quietism is a comprehensible 
response to the difficulty ofrealizing justice in America," she writes. "But 
it is a bad response. It collaborates with evil."7 (This is not a pretty review.) 
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What is so bad about Butler's feminist politics, according to Nussbaum, is 
that Butler forsakes attention to the material reality of women's lives for 
rhetorical analysis. Butler's writing represents, for Nussbaum, a "disquiet- 
ing trend" in feminist heory, that is, "a type of verbal and symbolic poli- 
tics that makes only the flimsiest of connections with the real situation of 
real women" (p. 38). The term "verbal politics" implies that Butler's poli- 
tics is "only words." Nussbaum's argument, hen, would seem to go against 
Scarry's. Justice, for Nussbaum, would seem to lie in action, not in the 
beauty of a painting or a text. 
Yet it is not just any verbal politics that Nussbaum attacks. Nussbaum's 
argument focuses pecifically on the kind of prose Butler writes. She begins 
her review by criticizing the "thick soup of Butler's prose," her "ponderous 
and obscure" style (p. 38). Butler's "verbosity," Nussbaum says, "bullies the 
reader" (p. 39) in that she or he must expend so much energy in decipher- 
ing the prose that there is little left for contemplating its truth. Worse, 
Nussbaum suspects that Butler's tyle is a deliberate attempt o keep read- 
ers from contemplating the truth of what she says, suggesting that there is 
nothing behind the words to support any claim to truth. Nussbaum, as one 
of "the bullied readers of Butler's books,"8 is forced to rewrite Butler, to put 
what Butler has said in other words-Nussbaum's words-to try to tease 
out what might have been meant. When she does so, Nussbaum discovers 
that Butler's ideas are familiar, even shopworn. (Not surprisingly. Once you 
drain off the thick soup, you are left with only a few noodles.) Butler's 
greatest sin, it seems, is less what she has said than that she might have said 
it better. Saying it better would mean making it clear, writing in a prose 
style that is more a translucent broth than a thick soup. That kind of prose 
is itself a model of equanimity, of equality between writer and reader, says 
Nussbaum; thus, it establishes on the level of the writing the just relations 
one would hope to establish in real life.9 In this one sense, Nussbaum and 
Scarry would seem to be making similar arguments. 
For Nussbaum as for Scarry, faulty syntax is not just indicative of failed 
logic (as in a lapse of parallelism that undermines the symmetry of an 
argument) but of a flawed sense of justice and a moral failing as well. 
Nussbaum says Butler's bad writing collaborates with evil. Hume's prose 
style, in contrast, demonstrates "a gracious spirit" that "respects the 
reader's intelligence" (p. 40).1o Similarly, Scarry argues that the proclama- 
tion "We hold these truths to be self-evident" is just precisely because it 
scans (p. 102). Its verbal symmetry materializes the symmetry ofjust social 
relations, makes the beauty of justice, which is after all an abstraction, 
available to sensory perception (p. 106). Beauty produces justice because it 
creates in us a moral sensitivity to imbalance and injustice. The fact that 
the "we" in this statement, which ostensibly refers to all Americans, actu- 
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ally refers specifically to white men of property would not, in Scarry's view, 
undermine her argument that love of beauty leads to social justice, for one 
could argue that the original intention of the drafters of the Constitution 
embodied in this balanced prose has eventually been extended laterally to 
bodies neither white nor male. 
Scarry's argument at least has this advantage: it would restore literature 
and composition teachers to the center of liberal education. Thus, it has a 
certain political utility at a time when English departments are in a state 
of decline, as Robert Scholes, among others, has recently argued." As the 
ones who teach students to appreciate the beauty of a well-turned phrase 
and to strive to reproduce that balance and clarity in their own writing, we 
help the Armenians. It is an attractive argument. But it betrays a nostalgia 
for a notion of pedagogy and liberal education that, as I argue elsewhere, 
has passed.'2 
Pedagogy in literary studies, as Carolyn Porter has pointed out, has tra- 
ditionally been based on a liberation politics on the one hand and an aes- 
thetic formalism on the other.'3 According to the first perspective, litera- 
ture represents the world outside the text and expresses the writer's atti- 
tudes and feelings. Thus, the study of literature has a moral and political 
imperative: it conveys knowledge about others living in a world apart and 
thereby promotes cultural literacy and democratic values. Art bears a 
reflective relation to the real. According to formalist aesthetics, on the 
other hand, literature is not about life; rather, it is a special kind of lan- 
guage act that is distinct from ordinary or scientific language. The purpose 
of studying literature isto sensitize us to the experience of language itself, 
not simply to what it represents. The mirror is broken. 
Far from competing with each other, these two views have actually sus- 
tained a certain notion of liberal education: liberal education promotes the 
social and political values of a democracy (and thus the attention to diver- 
sity in the liberationist model) and transmits he universal moral truths on 
which that democratic society is based (and thus formalism's concern with 
common texts and shared standards). The integrity of our profession-its 
moral rectitude as well as its respectability-has long depended on the 
compatibility of these two apparently competing pedagogies. It is these 
pedagogies that were challenged by the emergence of theory and cultural 
criticism three decades ago. Catherine Belsey wrote in 1980: "Only by 
closing the doors of the English department against theoretical [and I 
would add, political] challenges from outside can we continue to ignore the 
'Copernican' revolution which is currently taking place, and which is rad- 
ically undermining traditional ways of perceiving both the world and the 
text."14 
The Copemican revolution Belsey refers to is the theory-or, more pre- 
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cisely, the structuralist-revolution. Jacques Lacan attributes a "revolution 
in knowledge" to Saussure's formula for the sign (Signifier over Signified) 
because it held that meaning was differential not referential: "No meaning 
is sustained by anything other than reference to another meaning."'5 This 
theory of language shifts the locus of evaluation from the meaning, truth, 
or beauty of the "thing itself" to the place of the sign in a system of differ- 
ential relations. But more is at stake here than a choice between two 
notions of language (referential or differential, Cartesian or structuralist). 
What is at stake in the theory revolution is not just a different response to 
literature but a new responsibility. For this revolution breaks what George 
Steiner calls "the classic contract between word and world." 16 
In his 1978 essay, "On Difficulty," Steiner has already addressed the 
charge that Nussbaum (and, to a lesser extent, Scarry) brings against con- 
temporary theory that seems inattentive if not downright hostile to beauty 
(and, by implication, truth) and thus indifferent to social justice. Rather 
than assume, as Nussbaum does, that difficulty is necessarily bad, that lan- 
guage should be transparent, Steiner asks what we mean when we say a 
poem or, in Butler's case, a piece of prose is difficult. At one crucial level, 
Steiner writes, "this is a question about language itself": "What is signified 
by the pragmatic experience that a lexically constituted and grammatically 
organized semantic system can generate impenetrability and undecidabili- 
ties of sense?" (p. 18). (That is a sentence worthy of Butler herself.) The 
notion that difficulty means interference with communication, a failure to 
clarify one's meaning, is a Cartesian reading of opaqueness (p. 18). This 
classic view, Steiner says, activates a metaphor of separation and transfer 
between word and meaning, intention and utterance that sets up a con- 
tract of ultimate intelligibility between writer and reader; thus, interfer- 
ence is negative. Rather than accept this notion of language, Steiner 
answers his question-"What do we mean when we say [a piece of writing] 
is difficult?" (p. 18)-by establishing a taxonomy of difficulty. There are 
contingent difficulties that can be resolved through the work of elucidation 
or "looking [things] up" (p. 23); modal difficulties that arise when one does 
not feel compelled by the work to respond to it; and tactical difficulties cre- 
ated by the writer's intentions, ay, when the difficulty is intended for styl- 
istic effect or to protect he writer's anonymity. "Each of these three classes 
of difficulty," writes Steiner, "is part of the contract of ultimate or prepon- 
derant intelligibility between poet and reader, between text and meaning" 
(p. 40). Yet "there is a fourth order of difficulty which occurs where this 
contract is itself wholly or in part broken" (p. 40). That fourth type, which 
he terms "ontological difficulty," implicates this very notion of language as 
communication. Steiner locates ontological difficulty inpoetry at the turn 
of the century, produced within the crises of idioms and values that came 
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with new technologies, the rise of mass and consumer culture, and an 
increasingly democratic and literate society. Such writing, Steiner says, 
"generates the poetics of 'dissemination' . . . that we find in Derrida and 
the current school of semiotics" (p. 46).'7 As Steiner puts it (in a sentence 
that brings to mind Lacan): "It is not so much the poet who speaks, but 
language itself" (p. 46). Steiner ends his essay by raising the question of 
whether such difficulty "is a transient phenomenon or represents some 
ultimate break in the classic contract between word and world" (p. 47). 
The last two decades have shown that this phenomenon is no passing 
fad, however much Nussbaum suggests it is in her numerous references to 
the "young women" to whom Butler's writing appeals (a feature of 
Nussbaum's review that Jane Gallop noted in her 1999 MLA paper, "Good 
Theory, Bad Writing"), as if their youth were an index of their ephemeral- 
ity and the ephemerality of Butler's writing. On the contrary, one could 
argue (as I have) that the shift from literary to cultural studies has been an 
effort to institutionalize this revolution in thinking about language. If con- 
tingent difficulties were the focus of an earlier hermeneutics, ontological 
difficulties have been the concern of poststructuralists andcultural critics. 
This revolution in language has implications for our thinking about the 
subject, and thus for our thinking about ethics, for the issue here is less the 
banishing of beauty than the crisis of responsibility that follows in the 
wake of the many changes our profession has undergone in the past two 
decades.'8 The new responsibility I spoke of earlier presents us with a moral 
imperative to give up the subject of Enlightenment humanism that, as 
Lacan says, "renders modem man so sure of being himself even in his 
uncertainties about himself" (p. 311). 
This disruption of the integrity of the subject is found not just in the 
(post)structuralists but in J. L. Austin's linguistic theory as well. What 
Austin's theory of the performative does-and this is far more radical than 
Nussbaum's understanding of the performative as meaning simply that 
words function as actions rather than as assertions (p. 40)-is to undercut 
the "solid moralist" who believes that "accuracy and morality alike are on 
the side of the plain saying that our word is our bond.""9 To say the perfor- 
mative does not refer to something outside of language or express ome- 
thing inside the speaker's head, and thus that it cannot be evaluated in 
terms of accuracy or truth in any simple way, and then to suggest, as Austin 
ultimately does, that all speech acts are performatives insofar as they are 
conventional, is to drive a wedge between word and bond, thereby under- 
cutting our habit of attributing meaning to the speaker alone.20 The nec- 
essary connection between clarity and meaning, between meaning and 
intention, can no longer be assumed-not because language bears only the 
flimsiest connection to the real, material world, but because assessing the 
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truth or falsity of a statement and attributing intentions can never be done 
outside the performative dimension of language. If we no longer believe in 
the classic contract between word and world, if we no longer believe that 
"accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying" (p. 10), 
then it becomes all the more imperative that we take responsibility for our 
modes of inquiry rather than assume certain kinds of inquiry are, by their 
very nature, ethical or evil, as Nussbaum assumes Butler's quietism is inher- 
ent in her prose style (p. 44). We cannot control the reception of our writ- 
ing any more than we can control the trajectory of our desires, yet our writ- 
ing does reveal an implicit ethics and commitment in its performance-but 
only if we accept a different otion of writing from the classic contract hat 
Nussbaum upholds. 
Nussbaum's commitment to the classic contract is evident not only in 
her criticism of Judith Butler but in her reading of Virginia Woolf. In the 
last chapter of Sex and Social Justice, Nussbaum reads Part I of To the 
Lighthouse as an inquiry into the classic philosophical problem of knowing 
other minds. According to Nussbaum, Lily learns to give up the desire for 
full knowledge of Mrs. Ramsay that she wants early on-the desire to pos- 
sess Mrs. Ramsay that is, Nussbaum says, a desire for power-for the more 
modest and ethical desire to know "one thing or another thing" about 
someone else.2" The expressions Nussbaum uses, such as "Lily quickly rec- 
ognizes," Lily soon discovers," and "there appears to be wisdom in Lily's 
shift" (p. 365), attest to Nussbaum's strong conviction that knowing 
another means accepting the other as a fully separate person. Moreover, to 
know that one cannot fully know another is a sign of one's moral integrity. 
"Knowledge," Nussbaum asserts, "is a function of character" (p. 371). Not 
surprisingly, perhaps, the philosopher Mr. Ramsay, despite his bullying 
nature, is Nussbaum's example of the truly ethical person in that he accepts 
Mrs. Ramsay as a separate person apart from him. Never mind that "to pur- 
sue truth with such astonishing lack of consideration for other people's 
feelings," as Mr. Ramsay does, is, for Mrs. Ramsay, "an outrage of human 
decency" (p. 32). The kind of trust and generosity Mr. Ramsay exhibits in 
his reading of Sir Walter Scott he transfers to his relations with Mrs. 
Ramsay, Nussbaum says, and that trust "is admirable as an ethical norm 
even if we would prefer to see it realized in the context of greater justice" 
(p. 372). (Here it is Mr. Ramsay's character that lends to Scott's novels a 
certain ethical valence, not, as Scarry would have it, the beauty of the 
novels that leads Mr. Ramsay to be generous.) 
For Nussbaum, literature offers lessons in moral living, provides us with 
occasions for exercising our moral judgment. The ethical norm is not so 
much established through the force of Woolf's writing as it is illustrated in 
the course of her narrative. Literature has no performative force; it makes 
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nothing happen through its mode of writing but only through its message. 
Although Nussbaum distinguishes between words that express our 
thoughts and words that function as "agents," what she means by the lat- 
ter is how words reveal the motivations and desires of the speaker that lie 
behind the language. In other words, what Austin terms the constative 
function of language is the norm for communication in Sex and Social 
Justice. What makes Mr. Ramsay such a generous reader is that he "does 
not read ... in the manner of a skeptical theorist of interpretation" (p.
371). Likewise, the joy of Woolf's prose lies in its clear communication of 
ethical norms, norms that the philosopher Nussbaum happens to share. 
To believe that fiction gives us versions of real-life vents so that we can 
hone our skills in making ethical and just decisions is to assume that ethics 
and justice exist before the law, outside the force of language and repre- 
sentation. If fiction is the mirror of life, if language communicates norma- 
tive values, then we can judge characters as we judge people, holding them 
up to the same moral standards. But if fiction is understood as representa- 
tional and conventional, if language is understood as performative rather 
than constative, then we must learn to read people and events as we learn 
to read characters and writing. Textual analysis, or verbal politics, I argue, 
becomes an ethical imperative. We learn how to negotiate the force of lan- 
guage and law. 
Rather than assume that the difficulty ofButler's prose is bad and inter- 
feres with meaning, we can understand the nature of the difficulty as
"ontological," in Steiner's terms, a difficulty hat implicates the very func- 
tion of language as communication. For example, Butler's rhetorical naly- 
sis of the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling on hate speech (R.A.V. v. St. Paul) 
in Excitable Speech shows how the ruling equated (that is, saw as morally 
equivalent) the burning of a cross on a black family's lawn and a speech 
against a tax on gasoline delivered in a public park.22 Both are protected as 
free speech. This moral leveling process is achieved rhetorically by the 
written decision in that it ignores the race of the family targeted by hate 
speech and it separates the content of the message (its expression of 
racism, protected by the First Amendment) from the vehicle of expression 
(the burning cross that signifies a history of racist violence in the U.S.). 
This kind of analysis is what Nussbaum means by Butler's "verbal politics," 
implying that her politics lies in rhetorical analysis rather than in social 
action. Yet such analysis not only exposes a particular notion of justice but 
implicates language itself as the very force of justice, not simply its vehicle 
of expression. Justice, Butler shows, exists elsewhere than where we have 
commonly seen it: not in the beauty and logic of a well-written decision 
based on supposedly neutral standards or normative values, but in the 
avowedly partial decision that responds to particular social and historical 
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conditions in which the act is embedded. Butler's analysis, I would argue, 
produces what Scarry terms "the small flex of the mind" (p. 51) that cre- 
ates the mental agility to see and to value differently than we have before. 
So if bad writing might do some good, we might want to question the 
underlying premise in Scarry's and Nussbaum's arguments. Is it true that 
postmodern theory and cultural criticism have banished beauty and with it 
a commitment to social justice, creating a crisis of responsibility? Well, one 
can hardly deny that the vocabulary of beauty has not had much currency 
lately. When I was a graduate student in the mid 1980s, I used to raise eye- 
brows even then when I proclaimed The Rainbow by D. H. Lawrence the 
most beautiful novel in the English language. Today, I could no longer 
make such a statement, not because it would be politically incorrect, but 
because it would be critically irresponsible, orrather irresponsive to the 
social relations in which Lawrence's writing is embedded. For an example, 
let me turn to another text by Lawrence, the novella "The Woman Who 
Rode Away." Published in 1925, it is the story of an American woman who 
seeks out the Indians living in the mountains of Chihuahua for her own 
spiritual renewal only to be captured and ultimately sacrificed by the 
natives. The narrative nds with the old chief's knife poised above the 
woman's naked body as the Indians wait for the last rays of the setting sun 
to enter the cave where the sacrifice will take place: "Then the old man 
would strike, and strike home, accomplish the sacrifice and achieve the 
power. The mastery that man must hold, and that passes from race to 
race."23 The last line scans, it has a certain beauty, it even could be 
described as radically decentering in that the narrative attempts to extend 
the beauty and truth of the native cosmology to Western culture as an 
antidote to its crass materialism. But read in the context of the 1920s, 
implicated as the text is in the cultural anxiety aroused by the emergence 
of the New Woman, in the tourism of the American Southwest, and in the 
"Indianization" of Native Americans, the statement raises for me a more 
compelling question than that of its beauty or clarity of vision. Where do 
the values expressed in the narrative come from? Who would want to 
endorse Lawrence's vision of cosmic unity and sexual harmony? Where 
does the responsibility liefor such a vision? 
For me, beauty can no longer be-if it ever actually was-the single, 
overriding criterion by which we judge a work of art. I suppose this makes 
me, in Scarry's words, an opponent of beauty, an ugly position to be in. 
Scarry says opponents of beauty value only those perceptions that produce 
discomfort because they open one's eyes to injustice. This is a sad state, 
Scarry says, for it closes one off to the perception of beautiful sights and 
sounds that create pleasure and joy. Yet Scarry underestimates the rush of 
... pleasure, could we call it? that some get from the kind of moral outrage 
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that comes with detecting injustice. Nussbaum, one would suppose, got a 
certain pleasure from exposing Butler as a fraud. In fact, if everyone were a 
good writer, gracious, sincere, clearly expressing his or her intentions, how 
would a critic ever experience not just the superiority but the exhilaration 
that comes from exposing another? The banishing of beauty has its own 
pleasures. 
Yet it seems to me that literary criticism of the past two decades has not 
so much answered Clarissa's question in the negative-no, your love of 
roses doesn't do a damn thing for the Armenians-as it has sidestepped the 
question entirely. There is no simple relation between art and social justice 
or between theory and politics. It is the belief that we must find a causal 
link that leads to such ugly charges as Nussbaum's claim that Butler's writ- 
ing collaborates with evil. As Joan Scott argues in her response to 
Nussbaum: 
To deduce politics from theory, asNussbaum does, is to misunderstand the
operations ofboth. The job of theory isto open new avenues of understand- 
ing, to trouble conventional wisdom with difficult questions. The job of pol- 
itics . . . is to secure some end in a contested, conflictual field. Politics and 
theory may inform one another at certain moments with successful orunsuc- 
cessful results-the outcomes are not predictable.24 
Nor can one predict that the cultivation of an aesthetic response will 
increase our moral sensitivity. Steiner observes in Language and Silence that 
the guards at Auschwitz listened to Bach and Beethoven as they sent the 
Jews to their deaths.25 But the fact that there is no predictive relation does 
not mean there is no relation. As Edwards demonstrates, what is at one 
time thought o be apolitical (such as Woolf's writings of the 1920s) can 
come to be seen as decidedly political with a change in audience and a new 
motivation for writing and reading literature. 
Rather than say that beauty has been banished, I would say that the 
notion of beauty, especially the beauty of language, has been displaced by 
the notion of desire in language. Beauty is an imposed notion of what is 
pleasing or sublime; desire is dynamic, something that happens between 
subjects. To understand language as a field of desire, not a medium of 
communication, isto break the "classic contract between word and world" 
that leads us to evaluate writing in terms of how closely it matches up with, 
or imposes a certain meaning on, reality. It is not that we no longer per- 
ceive beauty in the natural world or in the written text, but that we no 
longer conceive beauty as an inherent quality of the thing itself. Beauty 
originates in representation; it is the image that mediates our desires. The 
question now, post-Berger, is who controls representation? "What matters 
now is who uses that language for what purpose?"26 
The real conflict going on now is not between those who appreciate 
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beauty and those who oppose it, or between those whose moral integrity is
evident in their clear prose and those who write badly and thus collaborate 
with evil. The real conflict is over who controls representation. But has 
this not long been the case in the humanistic tradition at the heart of our 
vocation? Rethinking accepted truths, struggling to locate new sources of 
conviction, offering a critique of the status quo-these are the values that 
still sustain humanistic inquiry even in the midst of our current anxiety 
over the apparent dissolution of the humanities. "The practice of human- 
istic service," writes Edward Said in his 1999 MLA Presidential Address, 
"always entails a heroic unwillingness torest in the consolidation of previ- 
ously existing attitudes."27 That desire has not passed, only a particular 
notion of beauty. 
The turn to theory has led many of us to rethink our learned notions of 
the aesthetic realm and thus to rethink where ethics and social justice take 
place. That is to say, the shift in critical attention from the beauty of the 
language to desire in language has its own moral imperative and commit- 
ment to justice. And that may or may not help the Armenians. 
NOTES 
1 Virginia Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981), 
p. 120. The reference to the Armenians or Albanians is obscure. Woolf probably 
had in mind the Armenian massacres of a few years earlier. The Turkish national- 
ism that prevailed with the disintegration ofthe Turkish empire after WWI led to 
continued persecution of the Armenians well after the war, the kind of scenario we 
have seen repeated in Bosnia and Kosovo. So persistent was the genocide against 
the Armenians that "starving Armenians" became a cultural trope, as one historian 
told me, a catch phrase his mother used when he was a child to get him to finish 
his meals. Clarissa could well be mixing up discussions in Parliament of the 
Armenian persecutions with those having to do with international recognition of 
Albania as an independent state in 1921 or to border disputes between Albania 
and Greece. I can find no specific incident in June 1923 to which this passage 
might allude. As I was sending off this paper, however, I saw an ad in The New York 
Times (9 June 2000) testifying that 126 Holocaust scholars had recently signed a 
statement affirming that the Armenian genocide of WWI was "an incontestable 
historical fact" and calling on the governments of Western democracies to urge the 
government of Turkey to recognize that fact and "to finally come to terms with a 
dark chapter of Ottoman-Turkish history." 
2 Lee R. Edwards, "War and Roses: The Politics of Mrs. Dalloway," in The 
Authority of Experience: Essays in Feminist Criticism, ed. Arlyn Diamond and 
Edwards (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977), p. 162. Subsequent 
references will be cited parenthetically inthe text. 
3 Elaine Scarry, On Beauty and BeingJust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999), pp. 65, 80-81. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically in the 
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text. Scarry's discussion brought to mind an incident I witnessed at the 
International Conference on Narrative held in Vancouver. On one keynote panel, 
a well-known Canadian theorist presented an elegant paper on Canadian opera. A 
well-known African novelist on the panel was supposed to respond to the 
Canadian theorist's paper. The novelist got up and said that she had nothing to say 
about this paper on opera, that the emotions evoked by that cultural form were too 
foreign to her for her to make any comments. There followed a series of responses 
from the audience basically sympathizing with the African woman and accusing 
the Canadian woman of being imperialist or Eurocentric n her presentation. Then 
Hortense Spillers got up and said to the African novelist: have you no music in 
your culture? Could you not draw some connection between the role of music in 
your culture and the role of opera in hers? Reading Scarry it struck me that this 
might well be an example of "lateral disregard" on the part of the African novelist. 
4Given that Dr. Bradshaw in Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway is one of the guardians of 
Proportion as well as Conversion, proportion in and of itself is not necessarily a 
value. One must ask, whose notion of proportion is going to count? Proportion 
toward what end? 
5 Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1981), p. 52. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically inthe text. 
6 Scarry's argument might well be extended back a few more decades to the turn 
of the last century, for as Mark Edmundson argued in his 1999 MLA paper, 
"Thirteen Ways of Looking at Beauty," Nietzsche and Freud were both dubious 
about the union of truth and beauty, sensing that the analytic spirit was antitheti- 
cal to the love of beauty. 
I Martha C. Nussbaum, "The Professor of Parody," The New Republic, 22 
February 1999, p. 45. 
8 At the 1999 MLA convention, Jane Gallop gave a brilliant paper on the rela- 
tionship between style and morality that offered an incisive critique of Nussbaum's 
review. In that paper, entitled "Good Theory, Bad Writing," Gallop used this 
phrase in reference to Nussbaum, turning the philosopher's words against herself. 
9 Nussbaum's criticism of Butler relies on the traditional, Platonic distinction 
between philosophy and rhetoric, a distinction called into question by contempo- 
rary theorists in a number of fields. Philosophy for Nussbaum, as for Plato, is "a dis- 
course of equals" that shows "respect for the soul," while rhetoricians' "manipula- 
tive methods" show '"only disrespect" (p. 40). For a different reading of this tradi- 
tional split, see my Virginia Woolf and Postmodemism (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1991), chapter 4; Susan C. Jarratt, Rereading the Sophists: Classical Rhetoric 
Refigured (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1991), chapter 
4; and Dominick LaCapra, History and Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1985). 
10 Of course, Hume's implied reader was white and male, and thus the contract 
of intelligibility between writer and reader rested on the assumed innate rational- 
ity of white men. In Figures in Black (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1987), Henry Louis Gates, Jr., quotes a footnote to Hume's essay "Of 
National Characters" to show how his beautiful style "posited with all of the 
authority of philosophy the fundamental identity of complexion, character, and 
intellectual capacity" (p. 18). I would imagine that for Nussbaum this attitude 
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would be incidental to Hume's philosophical arguments, an accident of time and 
location and thus not relevant o his prose style. 
11 Robert Scholes, The Rise and Fall of English: Reconstructing English as a 
Discipline (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998). Scarry's argu- 
ment brings to mind that of Stanley Fish in Professional Correctness: Literary Studies 
and Political Change (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Both Scarry and 
Fish seek to restore, or at least to explain, what is distinctive to literary criticism. 
Although Scarry argues that the appreciation of beauty contributes to a more just 
society and Fish argues that literary criticism has no direct impact on the social 
order, both confront the political arguments made against raditional modes of aes- 
thetic criticism. 
12 For a more extensive discussion of my argument here, see chapter 2 of my 
Passing and Pedagogy: The Dynamics of Responsibility (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1999). 
13 Carolyn Porter, "History and Literature: 'After the New Historicism,"' New 
Literary History, 21 (Winter 1990), 253-81. 
14 Catherine Belsey, Critical Practice (London: Methuen, 1980), p. 130. 
15 Jacques Lacan, "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious," in The 
Structuralists: From Marx to Levi-Strauss, ed. Richard T. De George and Fernande 
M. De George (Garden City, New York: Anchor, 1972), p. 292. Subsequent refer- 
ences will be cited parenthetically inthe text. 
16 George Steiner, "On Difficulty," inOn Difficulty and Other Essays (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 47. Subsequent references will be 
cited parenthetically inthe text. 
17 In his essay "Signature Event Context," in Limited Inc (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), Derrida writes of "dissemination": The 
semantic horizon that habitually governs the notion of communication isexceeded 
or split by the intervention of writing, that is, by a dissemination irreducible to pol- 
ysemy. Writing is read; it is not the site, 'in the last instance,' of a hermeneutic deci- 
phering, the decoding of a meaning or truth" (p. 21). 
18 In a recent article in The New York Times Book Review Perry Meisel also argues 
that the theory revolution has not been a passing fad and argues against the popu- 
lar belief that literary studies is now in disarray. "In fact," writes Meisel, "literary 
study in America has never been in better shape. Enriched by a variety of European 
methodologies since the early 70's, it has grown into a vast, synthetic enterprise 
characterized by powerful continuities rather than by disjunctions," in "Let a 
Hundred Isms Blossom," The New York Times Book Review, 28 May 2000, p. 27. 
19 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1975), p. 10. Nussbaum's limited understanding ofthe performa- 
tive leads her to dismiss Butler's argument about Austin's use of the marriage cere- 
mony as an example of performatives. "Itis usually a mistake to read earth-shaking 
significance into a philosopher's pedestrian choice of examples," Nussbaum writes 
(p. 41). On the contrary, the reiteration of a naturalized gender elation is precisely 
to the point in that Butler defines the performative as "that power of discourse to 
produce effects through reiteration," inBodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits 
of "Sex" (New York and London: Routledge, 1993), p. 20. 
20 Two passages from Austin are relevant here: 
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It is essential to realize that "true" and "false," like "free" and "unfree," do not 
stand for anything simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a 
right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circum- 
stances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions. (p. 
145) 
What will not survive the transition, unless perhaps as a marginal imiting 
case, and hardly surprisingly because it gave trouble from the start, is the 
notion of the purity of performatives: this was essentially based upon a belief 
in the dichotomy of performatives and constatives, which we see has to be 
abandoned in favour of more general families of related and overlapping 
speech acts. (p. 150) 
21 Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), p. 365. Subsequent references will be cited parenthetically inthe text. 
22 Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (N w York and London: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 52-65. 
23 D. H. Lawrence, "The Woman Who Rode Away," in The Woman Who Rode 
Away and Other Stories, ed. Dieter Mehl and Christa Jansohn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 71. 
24 Joan W. Scott, Letter to the Editor, The New Republic, 19 April 1999, p. 44. 
25 Steiner, Language and Silence (New York: Antheneum, 1967), p. 61. 
26 John Berger. Ways of Seeing (London: BBC and Penguin Books Ltd., 1972), p. 
33. 
27 Edward Said, "Presidential Address 1999: Humanism and Heroism," PMLA, 
115, No. 3 (2000), 290. 
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